"interest" cannot be sufficient to establisb moral relevance, since Regan's concept of interests would, according to them, entails that tractors as well as can bave "interests" in that sense.
Many animal scientists also reject talk of animals' interests or desires or caring, usually preferring terms sucb as "needs" wbicb seem to them more quantifiable and testable, bence more scientifically respectable. A full defense of my appeal to a concept of "caring about" sbould address the scientific claim; also Carruthers's arguments on this subject, and would explore some reasons wby Daniel Dennett's recent account of consciousness 5 poses a very similar threat to talk. of animals' interests and caring. Althougb there will not be time to do justice to these themes today, they do indicate the range of serious cballenges to the idea that animals do have interests and care about things.
As I have already acknowledged, terms like "interests" have a rather messy bistory, even within the narrow confines of debates about animals. Very roughly, with many intermediate possibilities left aside, the two opposing interpretations of "S bas an interest in 0'>6 would be:
(1) "S [rationally?] desires 0," or (2) "0 would enhance S's ability to fulfill its proper function, role, or telos." Sense (1) is the one that leads Frey, Carruthers, and Leahy to reject the claim that animals can bave full-blown morally weighty interests. Again acknowledging the oversimplification, it would seem that for all three, S's desiring 0 entails (a) that there is a way of specifying, fixing, or correctly identifying the object of S's desire, and (b) that S bas the capacity to identify 0 and distinguisb it from things that would not satisfy the desire.
Tbe perbaps surprising link with Dennett comes primarily througb condition (a), with (b) providing a secondary connection. Althougb Deooett is generally considered a supporter of cognitive ethology and its references to the intentional mental states of animals,? his more recent championing of "beteropbenomonology" gives a special role to language in fIXing the appropriate ascription of intentional states.
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A tempting, but probably misguided, response to this argument is to treat it as a variant on the problem of other minds: we can never get to the truth of what the cat wants, because tbe cat can't tell us in unambiguous enougb terms. 9 If we interpret the issue this way, we migbt be tempted to respond: "we can't tell, but the cat can, and that's wbat matters." This would beg the question: the cbarge is not simply that we cannot properly identify the object of the cat's desire, but that it cannot have any desires without a language in wbicb to express true and false propositions about that object. The cbarge is that the cat lacks a medium in wbicb to refer to or represent the object of any belief or desire, and bence cannot bave beliefs and desires.
Contemporary pbilosopby provides a mucb more effective response to this concern about the possibility of baving an object of belief or desire.to The two salient points for our purpose, in their most general form, are: (1) any adequate psycbological theory that bopes to explain animal bebavior will have to attribute to many animals the ability to receive, encode, recall, and use sucb information; 11 and (2) there is no reason to think that the medium in whicb the mindlbrain encodes and manipulates information is identical with the language (if any) in wbicb one communicates. Hence, the lack of a natural language of communication does not provide good evidence against the bypothesis that a being bas a language of tbougbt. And it is tbe language of thougbt or something analogous to it, not communication, tbat provides the basis for propositional attitudes.
The first of these very general ideas drawn from contemporary pbilosopby of mind is an essential part of a more general demonstration of wby Bebaviorism simply won't work. Bebaviorism simply bas not been able to give an adequate theory wbicb explains the bebavior of (at least) birds and mammals simply in terms of stimulus response and positive and negative reinforcements; either because the salient features for explaining the feature may not be present in the environment at the time, or because the feature is not one wbicb can be captured in law-like statements about the environment. 12 In marked contrast to the failures of Bebaviorism, theories that work inevitably postulate that complex creatures can carry with them and access internally stored information about the world.
There are important disputes about the medium and mecbanisms required to store and use information: does it bave syntactic structure? bow holistic is it? etc. (Even, in Dennett's case: in wbat sense is it real?). The relevant point of agreement for our purposes is that the medium cannot be limited to natural languages such as Englisb. To do so (a) threatens to lead to an infinite regress of interpretations of linguistic signs, (b) overlooks the fact that a very large portion of cognitive psychology works as well for animals that lack a natural language (small humans as well as nonhumans) as it does for adult language users, and (c) founders on the question of how we can learn a language without the prior ability to form hypotheses. Moreover, the inner representations in this medium, whatever it is, can be accurate or inaccurate, true or false, thus answering another of Frey's concerns.
If the foregoing argument is correct, we have explained how a being can have beliefs and desires without having a language with which to communicate descriptions about the objects ofthose inner states. Thus, many animals can have beliefs and desires, and satisfy the conditions set forth for having interests in amorally relevant sense. 13 Moreover, tractors don't have these sorts of inner states, and neither do paramecia.
14 However, we are not out of the woods yet: although tractors and paramecia don't have desires (because they don't have mental representations), computers might well, and it would certainly disturb our reflective equilibrium to fmd our moral theory generating direct duties to our PC's. This is where "caring about" becomes relevant. At least none of the current crop ofartificial life cares about whether it gets what it wants. 1S I wish to claim that we can identify a sense of "caring about" such that many animals typically do care about getting what they desire, but (at least the current generation of) computers do not. In order to justify that claim, we will have to unpack the notion of caring.
I propose to do this via an indirect approach: by asking if/how we might be justified in saying that one animal is happier or more contented than another. If animal scientists read this paper, they will certainly either cringe or fume at the sloppy, untestable language, but that is exactly why I chose these terms. Despite their lack of direct physiological or behavioral correlates or indicators (or "operant definitions"), terms like "happy" and "content" do have a justifiable place in the scientific study of animals, and they also provide a clearer foundation for investigating what animals care about.
The first thing any self-respecting animal scientist would do at this point is to ask what I mean by "happy," trying to raise the suspicion that there is no real state to be relied on here. The frrst thing any self-respecting philosopher would respond is that the demand for necessary and sufficient conditions was well buried with logical positivism; although we sometimes can and ought to offer such conditions, they· are not always necessary for knowledge or respectable science. The undeniable fact is that experienced observers can tell quite well when an animal is happy.
On the one hand, books about dog training, horseback riding, animal husbandry of all sorts, are filled with statements like: any good dog owner (dairyman, rider, etc.) can tell whether an animal is happy, fearful, bored, or irritated. On the other hand, at some point in almost any discussion of the treatment of fann or laboratory animal, someone inevitably raises the challenge: "But you can't really give us hard scientific data about how to tell whether an animal is happy, can you?" This challenge may be followed with the assertion that it is therefore wrong to demand that we act as if a severely confined animal is unhappy (since we don't know for sure that he is), or even the charge that one is committing the eighth deadly sin: anthropomorphism.
The answer to this challenge lies in some fairly straightforward epistemology. On the assumption that we can set aside extreme skepticism (which would mean we would have to doubt not only the mental life but the physical existence of the sow and her crate, as well as the mental lives offellow humans), there are two widely recognized reliable indications that we know what we are talking about, and that we are describing something real about the world.
The frrst way to convince you that I know what I'm talking about, that I'm saying something true, is to describe to you a general scientific theory and methodology that allows us to explain, predict, and understand in a fairly deep way, what is going on. If you ask me why stones roll downhill, and I glibly assure you that "it's because of gravity," you probably should probe to see whether I can back up my assertion in this sort of way. You might find out that I know no more about gravity than a nineteenth century biologist who blithely tells us that we move because of our elan vital.
This, of course, is the ultimate aim of science. We want to know not only what happens, but why it happens. As a result ofa better understanding of why things happen, I often also get better at predicting and identifying what happens: as a result of understanding. In the case of happiness, this approach does not look very promising.
However, we often do remarkably well even in the absence of such deep explanatory theories, and we do so without lapsing into "subjectivity." All of us, to some extent, and some of us to an astounding extent, can recognize features of the world without being able to spell out in any detailed way how we do so. Here are some examples: The objectivity in such cases is established in two ways. First, predictive success: the success rate of the chicken sexer can be determined quite easily, and good pattern recognizers will win more chess games. Second, where the observers are in fact picking out something that is really there, we find a high degree of intersubjective agreement, at least among skilled, trained, experienced practitioners. These two features provide good epistemic warrant for believing that observers are accurately detecting an objective feature of the world, something that is really "out there." Both features can often be found in judgments about an animal's emotional and mental states.
Predictive success in judging an animal's inner states, including happiness, comes down to whether we can interact as we want to with animals: they do what we want, don't attack us, settle down calmly, thrive without developing "vices," and so on. That's why books on dog training and horseback riding are so filled with talk about the need to recognize when an animals is happy or contented. Learning to recognize these states increases one's success at working well with the animal.
Intersubjective agreement (assuming objective, knowledgeable observers) is less obvious in the case of animal happiness because heavily influenced by preconceptions and the fact that we have been taught to talk about animals in more "rigorous" and "scientific" ways. However, if we focus on people who work and live with animals, the intersubjective agreement soon becomes apparent. Good dog handlers will usually agree about whether a dog is enjoying herself; two shepherds will pick out the same ewe as the one who is uncomfortable; and so on.
Given that reports by observers with a high degree ofpredictive success and intersubjective agreement are perfectly respectable sources of objective knowledge claims, and given that we have such a situation with reports about whether animals are happy, content, upset, etc., I conclude that we are justified in accepting those reports as descriptions of animals' actual states. Having done so, we are ready to return to the topic ofcaring about.
Having argued that we can talk about an animal's being happy or unhappy, and make reliable judgments about such states, I now propose to define what Scares about in terms of what makes S happy (or less unhappy) in the following manner:
S cares about 0 ifS directly desires 0,17 and getting or achieving 0 contributes to S's happiness.
This definition entails that getting (or being denied) what she cares about makes a difference to the general state of S's experienced well-being. It also allows for varying intensity of caring: some things will matter more than others. Finally, this definition entails that we can be mistaken about what we care about we can think we care about something, only to discover that we were wrong: when we achieve it, we discover that it does not make us happy. These features combine to delineate a real phenomenon in many humans and many animals. The resulting definition accords well with our ordinary concept of caring about, and helps explain why the objects of caring carry moral significance in a way that more neutral interests may not.
Let me emphasize that I am not claiming that we care about things because they contribute to our happiness; we may sometimes do so, but we may have all sorts of other reasons for caring about something. Rather, I am suggesting that a hallmark, a definitive criterion of what we care about (as opposed to what we think we care about) is that it contributes to our happiness or alleviates our unhappiness.
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to offer a complete axiology and to locate "what we care about" in that framework. However, at the very least, the sort of interests highlighted in this new vocabulary of "caring about" carry more prima facie moral weight than things that are merely "good for" some being. If one is a preference utilitarian, for example, caring about is a more obvious manifestation of preference than interests in any weaker sense. From a deontological perspective, paying due attention to what a being cares about seems an appropriate way of respecting the individual as a source of valuing, without reducing him! her to a mere contributor to the general good. In any event the values highlighted by what we care about will be hard to ignore in an adequate moral theory.
In this paper, I have argued for two theses. The ftrst is that arguments such as Frey's and Leahy's fail to establish that animals do not have interests in a morally relevant sense. The second is that we can identify the relevant sense of interests, and at least begin to illustrate its moral relevance, by focusing on the question of what animals care about. There is much more to be said on this topic, of course. The critical side of my argument must be extended to respond more specifically to other skeptics, such as Davidson and Carruthers, and potential skeptics such as Dennett. More work also remains to be done to establish the exact role in our moral theory of what beings care about. However, we have made signiftcant progress in both these directions. 3 That is, "interests" in a narrow sense, not the broad sense of interests in which something's being in S's interests reduces to that thing's being good in some way for S. The former sense has clear moral relevance for a utilitarian (especially a preference utilitarian), while the latter is unproven as a basis for moral concern. As Frey points out, tractors have interests in the broad sense, but not the narrow. (Frey, 1979, p. 233) .
